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Introduction
Dans l’Europe de 2004, le lancement du Musée de l’histoire et des cultures de l’immigration en France prendra une
dimension politique et culturelle considérable. Ce projet constituera pour tous les citoyens français et pour tous ceux
qui vivent en France un instrument de connaissance, de tolérance et d’intégration, de nature à renforcer la cohésion
nationale d’un pays dont l’identité est faite plus que jamais de tradition, d’ouverture et de diversité. -Jacques Toubon1
In 2004 Europe, the launch of the Museum of the History and Cultures of Immigration in France will take on a
considerable political and cultural dimension. This project will constitute for all French citizens and for all those who
live in France an instrument of knowledge, tolerance and integration, likely to strengthen the national cohesion of a
country whose identity is made more than ever of tradition, openness and diversity. - Jacques Toubon2

Former Minister of Culture Jacques Toubon expressed the above goals to then Prime
Minister of France Jean-Pierre Raffarin in a 2004 report which outlined plans for a new museum
in Paris. The museum, the Musée National de l’Histoire de l’Immigration intended to explore
how the history of immigration was a key part of French history, synthesize and extrapolate on
the history of immigration for the public, strengthen national cohesion, and create a cultural,
historical, and social site of inquiry and research.3 However, the museum’s goal of strengthening
national cohesion is complicated by its location and a state construction of national identity that
is stringent, and at times unaccepting. The building that houses the museum, Palais de la Porte
Dorée, was built to house the Colonial Museum for the 1931 World’s Fair. The imposing art
deco building is identifiable by the bas relief that covers its façade; a celebratory mix of images
of France’s relationship with her colonies.4 The various museums that have been housed in the
Palais since then have struggled to acknowledge the colonial past and memory of their location,
following national norms and often ignoring the colonial aspects completely. While the Musée
de l’Histoire de l’Immigration has acknowledged the colonial roots of the museum, it too has
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Jacques Toubon, “Rapport au Premier minister: Mission de Préfiguration du Centre de Ressources et de Mémoire de
l’Immigration,” (report to Prime Minister, Paris, 2004), 11.
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struggled to come to terms with its location and the connections between its themes of
immigration, identity, national cohesion, and France’s colonial past. Between the location whose
very foundation is imbued with colonialism, the memory debates about colonialism that inspired
the museum in the 1990s, and its theme, the site is inherently political on multiple levels.
The museum functions as a microcosm of France’s unsettled relationship between
French colonialism and the construction of French identity and thus provides a case study on
how the colonial past and the republican construction of identity are not only intertwined deeply,
but how French society cannot address major questions about immigration and colonialism
without restructuring the state definition of identity in France. The concept of national identity in
France is defined through the political and social contract that one has with one’s fellow citizens
and the state.5 Therefore, the construction of national identity in France, on a political and
societal level, is defined through a belief and adherence to the shared values of republicanism,
laïcité, and universalism. Identity in this paper is both civic and political in scope, but defined
through the ability to be considered French by the state and society at large on the basis of one’s
adherence to the afore mentioned values. My argument builds on the numerous scholars before
me who have explored the contradictions and nuances of French identity and memory, both as
explicitly related to the museum and more generally. This thesis aims to show how the museum
has attempted to change over time, but is bound by narratives of identity from the French state
that are deeply intwined with France’s colonial past. By exploring the coalescing of empire, the
1990s memory debates, and the rhetoric used by politicians that either supported or erased the
goals of the museum, I argue that because the museum functions as a microcosm of French
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Jim Wolfreys, Republic of Islamophobia: The Rise of Respectable Racism in France, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
2018), 89.
Maxim Silverman, Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, Racism, and Citizenship in Modern France, Critical Studies in
Racism and Migration, (London: Routledge, 1992), 127,147.
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society and the state, that the museum’s conundrum about the unsettled relationship between
identity and colonialism is in fact a French conundrum.
A Note on Terms
The National Immigration Museum in France has gone by multiple names, which this
paper uses chronologically to help highlight how other scholars have written about the museum
and its transitory and unsettled nature as a site which is at the heart of discussions about identity,
immigration, and colonialism. When the museum first opened it was named the Centre National
de l’Histoire de l’Immigration (CNHI), one because it did not have a permanent collection and
therefore was not considered a museum by the state, and two because it was intended to be a site
for a museum, archive, research facilities and cultural production, thereby encompassing far
more than the museum label.6 This paper uses the term CNHI when discussing the museum prior
to 2013. The museum underwent a name change in 2013 to better reflect its museological
mission and became the Musée National de l’Histoire de l’Immigration.7 This paper uses the
term to describe the museum from 2013 on or when it is referencing the museum generally as an
entity. Third, Immigration Museum will be used to refer to the museum, this will be used to
describe the museum across its entire trajectory, and simply is a shortened linguistic reference.

Caroline Ford, “Museums After Empire in Metropolitan and Overseas France*,” The Journal of Modern History 82, no. 3
(2010): 650.
7 Daniel J. Sherman, “The Perils of Patrimoine: Art, History, and Narrative in the Immigration History Museum, Paris,” Oxford
Art Journal, 39, no. 3 (2016): 459,479-480. https://doi-org.ezproxy.proxy.library.oregonstate.edu/10.1093/oxartj/kcw033
6
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Chapter One
From Multiculturalism in Europe to the Construction of French Identity
The Musee National de l’Histoire de l’Immigration exists at the cross-roads of two
different conceptions of a museum: that of the museum as a physical space, as the Palais de la
Porte Dorée, and that of the museum as a conceptual space. While other scholars have addressed
both aspects, this thesis intends to highlight how both the physical space and the conceptual
nature of the museum as representative of national and societal narratives about immigration,
function as a microcosm of French understanding of identity, immigration, and Frenchness. I
have scaffolded the works of scholars that focus on multiculturalism, immigration, museums and
empire, and memory to show how the Musée National de l’Histoire de l’Immigration remains a
conflicted site of memory and identity construction, which is ultimately a reflection of larger
French preoccupations with the same subjects. Rita Chin’s text The Crisis of Multiculturalism
functions as a commentary and analysis of the role of colonialism and immigration in the
construction of French identity. Chin’s work focuses broadly on Europe, drawing comparisons
between how different European nations have approached the question of multiculturalism, and
why it is considered to have failed in Europe.8
This work builds on her historical renderings of immigration over time in France, and
tracing how that has affected citizenship and identity construction in France. Chin explores the
vacillating responses to migration over time, and its trajectory towards an assumed inability to
assimilate, and thus further separation.9 She addresses the ever-present colonial past that haunts
conversations about communautarisme, assimilation, and identity.10 Chin’s analysis of the
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formation of the Other in France and the connections between immigration and xenophobia are
used in this paper to support the assertion that the current state construction of French identity is
in discord with nuanced conversations about colonialism and immigration. The construction of
French identity is a key point of this paper, as it forms the basis of the argument as to why
discussions about the historical and historiographical implications of colonialism and
immigration can never come to fruition under current identity constructs. Her analysis of
multiculturalism and France’s response to it help to explain the political and social response to
the museum from both the public and political figures, figures whose rhetoric this thesis utilizes
to show the relationship between the colonial past and French republican identity.
This is most aptly seen in the arguments from French politicians concerning
communautarisme, which politicians and social figures argue is the practice of a group
separating themselves on the basis of culture, race, or religion from French society at large. This
separation is seen as deliberately in conflict with the universalist French identity and is often
used in relation to Muslims in France, as well as individuals that are identified as immigrants,
most often from the Middle East and North Africa.11 Chin notes that immigrants were often
pushed to live in certain areas through economic or governmental means, as large housing
projects had been constructed for a variety of groups including foreign workers, immigrants, and
repatriated pied-noirs.12 This paper uses communautarisme in place of separatism because of its
usage by political figures to describe groups they consider to be unassimilated and or
inassimilable. Multiculturalism will be addressed through the categories of integration and
assimilation. Integration implies that immigrants are integrated into the society of the receiving
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Joan Wallach Scott, The Politics of the Veil, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 11.
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country, but doing so while being able to maintain certain cultural, social, or ethnic practices.
Assimilation implies that the immigrant will adjust and mold themselves to the new country,
leaving behind cultural, ethnic, and social practices or identity in favor of the new country’s.13
One must become French to be able to claim French identity; out of this, a Frenchness which has
predominately been defined by precepts that do not acknowledge difference and formed before
considerable migration from France’s former colonies.
As Chin shows in the Crisis of Multiculturalism in Europe, while concerns about
difference extend back beyond the Second World War, the current discussions about assimilation
and integration are predicated on concerns about immigrants from former colonies moving to
France permanently.14 Indeed, many of the arguments of communautarisme hinge on suspicion
of Muslim practices, including head coverings. Jim Wolfreys covers this more extensively in
Republic of Islamophobia, arguing that Islamophobia has been forged by political actors to form
a political and social reality in France which has been furthered by neo-liberal and reactionary
rhetoric.15 In addition, Wolfreys connects Islamophobia to rising social inequality and
immigration concerns that are harnessed and utilized by political figures.16 Wolfreys’ exploration
of political rhetoric on immigration and identity ground this paper’s analysis on how
immigration is utilized to explain and circumvent identity simultaneously. While identity in
France is not solely viewed through a lens of anti-Muslim sentiment, the formation of us versus
them narratives since the 1980s have heavily leaned on religious and cultural tropes of Islam as a
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way to distinguish true Frenchness and identity.17 Thus Wolfreys’ text helps to situate the French
principles of republicanism, universalism, and laïcité in the current political context.
Within the French context republicanism exists on the expectation and assumption that all
citizens are equal in the eyes of the state and refuses any specific rights to individual groups.18
Maxim Silverman notes that republicanism and the push for universalism in France can mask
regional and ethnic differences.19Republicanism’s history extends back to the French Revolution
and Enlightenment ideals.20 It was further solidified as a key aspect of defining identity in the
late 1800s as a way to lessen the power of the church in France.21 French universalism, is similar
to republicanism in that it refers to the belief and practice that all citizens are equal and
indistinguishable in public space. Citizenship is defined through political and social contract
within France, a set of shared values, versus ties through blood or race.22 This is further
supported by jus soli, or the right to citizenship on the basis of having been born on French soil,
versus citizenship solely being awarded based on one’s familial ties (inheriting French
citizenship because one has a parent who is French).23 Thus the concept of the citizen is political
in nature and one is tied to fellow citizens through ones participation in French society according
to French norms in public space.
Finally, the practice of laïcité, typically translated as secularism in English, is the belief
in a separation of church and state. Established by a law mandating the separation of church and

17

Wolfreys, Republic of Islamophobia, 30, 129,
Abigail Taylor, “Crimes of Solidarity: Liberté, Égalité and France’s Crisis of Fraternité,” The Conversation., Feburary 21,
2018. http://theconversation.com/crimes-of-solidarity-liberte-egalite-and-frances-crisis-of-fraternite-90010.
19 Maxim Silverman, Deconstructing the Nation, 17.
20 Naomi Schor, “The Crisis of French Universalism,” Yale French Studies 100, no. 100 (2001): 48.
21Edwige Liliane Lefebvre, “Republicanism and Universalism: Factors of Inclusion or Exclusion in the French Concept of
Citizenship,” Citizenship Studies 7, no. 1 (2003): 31. https://doi.org/10.1080/1362102032000048684.
22 Wolfreys, Republic of Islamophobia, 89.
Wolfreys, Republic of Islamophobia, 89.
23 Lefebvre, “Republicanism and Universalism,” 32.
18
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state in 1905, laïcité is understood to mean freedom from religion or the imposition of religion,
versus solely the freedom to practice religion and the protection of religious entities.24 While the
1905 law does protect the right to practice one’s religion, the contemporary understanding is that
religion “must be confined to the ‘private sphere.’”25Therefore religious symbolism, acts, and
clothing, are considered to be an imposition on one’s fellow citizens in public space. While the
1905 law denotes the separation of church and state, the most recent and increased use of laïcité
as a political device concerns the wearing of head coverings and face coverings associated with
Islam in schools and public space more generally.26 Each of these three concepts are key to
understanding how the Other is constructed in France, in addition to how integration and
assimilation is challenging because the key precepts of French identity do not reflect the lived
experiences of many citizens.
Wolfrey’s exploration of the development of Islamophobia ties the three concepts
together in the current political climate, highlighting how universalism, republicanism, and
laïcité are used to create exclusionary parameters to determine identity and Frenchness. Indeed,
the utilization of laïcité since the 1980s highlights how Wolfreys’ work on the normalization of
Islamophobia in France is built on a history of suspicion and distrust towards immigrant
populations that over time have been considered inassimilable, as noted by Chin.27 The
development of Islamophobia and its utilization in French politics is the larger context of the
speeches by former French presidents at key moments in the Immigration Museum’s history
highlighted in this paper. This thesis takes the assertions made by Wolfreys about Islamophobia

24

Scott, The Politics of the Veil, 15, 100.
Michael Barbaro, “France, Islam, and ‘Laïcité,’” interview with Constant Méheut, The Daily, podcast audio, February 12, 2021.
https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/france-islam-and-la%C3%AFcit%C3%A9/id1200361736?i=1000508726838
25 Wolfreys, Republic of Islamophobia, 93.
26 Wolfreys, Republic of Islamophobia, 93-94.
27 Chin, The Crisis of Multiculturalism in Europe, 6, 123.
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and its manifestation through political rhetoric and identity construction in France, and distills it
within the museum’s context. Wolfreys connects the formation of Islamophobia to immigration
and the perception of immigrants in France, highlighting how immigration takes on religious,
racial, and ethnic characteristics in political rhetoric that forms identity.28 This further highlights
the concepts of republicanism, universalism, and laïcité in the construction of French identity
and the way in which they rest on an assumption of cohesiveness and equality that is disproved
by France’s colonial past and colonial memory, both in the museum and in French society more
generally. This is key to the argument of this paper, as the museum is meant to reflect and
support a cohesive and republican French identity. In addition, the museum is utilized to discuss
integration and assimilation without always addressing the underlying systemic factors that are at
play with determining who is considered French.
Memory as a Catalyst, Preoccupation, and Colonial Legacy
In addition to the work of Chin and Wolfreys, who explore the construction of French
identity through responses to immigration and the political rhetoric used to construct a
republican identity, scholarship on the memory debates in France concerning the Algerian War
for Independence is key to addressing the construction of identity. Itay Lotem explores the
memory debates of the 1990s in France that formed early inspiration for the museum and the
legacy of colonialism in those debates.29 This work asserts that discussions about colonialism
and colonial memory cannot come to fruition under the current construction of French identity.
Instead, colonialism is often disregarded as a historical and historiographical entity which is
directly tied to France as a nation economically, politically, and culturally. Lotem argues that the

28

Wolfreys, Republic of Islamophobia, 38, 58.
Itay Lotem, The Memory of Colonialism in Britain and France: The Sins of Silence, Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial
Studies, (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021) 55. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63719-4.
29
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afterlife of colonial history is present and directly tied to political and social discourse at
different points over time.30 This afterlife can be described as a reinterpreting of memory within
new political and social contexts to fit the present moment and current concerns and anxieties
about race, identity, and the colonial past.31 This thesis uses his argument about how colonial
history is connected to political and social discourse to emphasize its use of presidential speeches
and rhetoric, which speak to French preoccupations with colonialism, immigration, and identity
as unsettled and divisive topics.
In addition to using the reinterpretations of colonial memory to discuss presidential
rhetoric, this thesis builds on his argument to show that the museum is attempting to reinterpret
colonial memory so as to have more nuanced conversations about immigration in response to
current world events. Lotem’s text addresses the formation of the memory debates that had a
particularly salient moment in the 1990s, a period of scholarship which increased enthusiasm for
a museum on immigration and resulted in the first committee to address the existence of such a
museum.32 In France, the key pivot point of historical memory was the unfinished debates about
systemic French military violence and torture, censorship, and commemoration in relation to the
Algerian War for Independence.33 The memory debates were grounded in three key academic
moments, the publication of Pierre Nora’s Les Lieux de Mémoire, the memory of the Vichy
regime, and Benjamin Stora’s focus on memory about the Algerian War for Independence and
the need for memorial reconciliation.34 As Lotem notes, with the addition of scholarship from
historians such as Pascal Blanchard, Nicholas Bancel, and Sandrine Lemaire the desire to

30

Lotem, The Memory of Colonialism in Britain and France, 7-8.
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33 Lotem, The Memory of Colonialism in Britain and France, 62.
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address the shadow of colonialism increased. In the post-2005 era, in which a law to promote the
“positive role of the French presence overseas, notably in North Africa,” and the 2005 banlieue
uprisings, “a new wave of literature about the relationship between history, memory and
contemporary identity” developed.35 Each of these catalyzed a debate about memory of the war
in Algeria and by a larger extension, colonialism as a whole. While not the focus of this paper,
the unsettled history of France’s colonization of Algeria, and the subsequent immigration and
migration that took place both before and after the war for independence, form key groups of
immigrants that the museum addresses, even if not explicitly described as such. In addition, the
opening of the museum in the post-2005 political landscape, saw a greater emphasis on
immigration and identity in France from both the public and politicians.
Nicolas Bancel and Pascal Blanchard’s work builds on Lotem’s to discuss colonial
memory and the limits of national and social forgetting. This paper utilizes their work on
memory to showcase how the museum contributes to its own conundrum of the unsettled
relationship between colonialism and identity. Bancel and Blanchard highlight in The Meanders
of Colonial Memory how “forgetting has clearly reached its limits,” in relation to colonial
memory and legacy.36
“Colonial memory” is diffracted. It circulates in narratives told by people with a
relationship to colonial history. It can be found in literature, movies, music, the fine arts,
but it is also constructed, as such, by public institutions: this is the “official memory” of
colonization. Memory, which intercedes between present realities and the recessive logic
of the narratives that give them meaning, is a process, a constant reconstruction.37

35

Lotem, The Memory of Colonialism in Britain and France, 11-12.
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Bancel and Blanchard’s definition of colonial memory highlights the ephemerality of memory
and simultaneously its importance in forming national and historical records. As they note,
colonial memory is viewed as both a reflective and exhuming practice which came to a head in
2005, after nearly twenty years of emphasis on memory and the Algerian War for Independence
(1954-1962).38 In addition, Bancel and Blanchard view colonial memory as a way to explore the
borders between history and memory, especially as narratives of colonial history must be seen as
collective history in France.39 Bancel and Blanchard’s assertion that colonial memory functions
as a “process, constant reconstruction” grounds this work in the shifting and unsettled debates
about identity and the role of colonialism and immigration in defining the French populace.40
The shifting process of colonial memory, which highlights national myths and narratives,
showcases how the process butts up against the national, republican construction of identity.
Even as the process of memory shifts and adapts it can only move so far in the conversation as it
is consistently pitted against a construction of identity that cannot accept those shifts, let alone
the memory process itself.
This thesis uses Blanchard and Bancel’s assertions that colonial memory is a “complex
phenomenon” which cannot be seen as momentary or a blip; an argument often used for the
Vichy regime that has been historically constructed as an event that is antithetical to
republicanism, and therefore an instance, not a pattern in French history.41 The argument about
colonial memory as a process and “complex phenomenon” helps to support this paper’s
argument about how colonialism is embedded in the construction of French identity, and that it
functions as a site of confusion, disregard, and outright erasure when discussing identity and

Bancel and Blanchard, “The Meanders of Colonial Memory,” 399, 401.
Bancel and Blanchard, “The Meanders of Colonial Memory,” 402-403.
40 Bancel and Blanchard, “The Meanders of Colonial Memory,” 400.
41 Bancel and Blanchard, “The Meanders of Colonial Memory,” 401.
38
39
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Frenchness conceptually. Blanchard and Bancel point to how colonial memory and the insistence
on its inclusion in historical processes are in direct opposition to existing narratives and
paradigms about national identity and French republicanism, which ultimately demands a
rewriting of the national narrative.42 This paper aims to show how that rewriting is not only
necessary on the scale of colonial memory as an academic and ideological concept, but that the
very institutions that purport to address identity cannot fully do so without breaking the existing
paradigms on national identity. The museum functions as a physical manifestation of how
narratives on national identity ultimately circumvent colonial memory to maintain a national
mythology of cohesion and universalism.
This paper aims to explore Bancel and Blanchard’s analysis of colonial memory and
French identity through the lens of the immigration museum, using the fact that it is a state
sponsored institution and the former colonial museum as a reflection of its conundrum of
addressing colonialism and colonial memory. I further explore Blanchard’s assertion that the
republican ideal of France is in fact built on the forgetting of colonialism, and in the case of this
paper, an identity built on such forgetting means that problematizing colonialism and
immigration are in opposition with the construction of identity as it exists in France.43 As
Blanchard states, the site of the Immigration Museum prevented the construction of a lieu de
mémoire, a memory site for colonial memory, effectively supplanting it with a related topic that
was still in the state’s interest. Blanchard goes on to point out that at the time of the opening of
the CNHI that France, in contrast to other former colonial states, did not have a museum of
colonization.44 In supplanting the colonial nature and past of the Palais de la Porte Dorée, the

Bancel and Blanchard, “The Meanders of Colonial Memory,” 404.
Bancel and Blanchard, “The Meanders of Colonial Memory,” 407.
44 Bancel and Blanchard, “The Meanders of Colonial Memory,” 405-406.
42
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CNHI becomes both a link and buffer to the necessary conversations between colonialism and
immigration. The museum ultimately reflects the state narrative of a cohesive, subsuming French
identity in which all immigrants eventually become French. By circumventing an institution that
explicitly addresses colonialism and colonial memory, the museum contributes to the conundrum
of the unsettled relationship between colonialism and identity, and how immigration functions as
a link between the two.
The Musée National de l’Histoire de l’Immigration’s Conflict with French Identity
Paradigms and Memory
This thesis uses the work of Laurence Gouriévidis to link Bancel, Blanchard, and
Lotem’s analysis of colonial memory’s connection to political and social discourse to the
immigration museum. She uses the CNHI as a site that represents the interpretation and
manufacture of memory for various contexts and needs in a museum.45 This highlights museums
as “catalysts in memory wars,” by demonstrating that museums are places in which memory is
inscribed and interpreted.46 Gouriévidis’s exploration of the CNHI through the interpretation of
memory builds on Lotem’s discussion of the memory debates of the 1990s. For the purposes of
this paper that exploration further establishes that the museum is a site in which colonial memory
and colonialism haunt the interpretation of immigration without fully coming to terms with it. In
using the CNHI as an example, Gouriévidis points to larger questions for colonial and
immigration museums about how transcultural and national paradigms are tied together and
simultaneously in conflict.47 This further supports this paper’s argument that the Immigration

Laurence Gouriévidis, “Representing migration in Museums: history, diversity and the politics of memory,” in Museums and
Migration: History, Memory and Politics, ed. Laurence Gouriévidis, (London: Routledge, 2014), 13.
46 Gouriévidis, “Representing migration in Museums,” 14.
47 Gouriévidis, “Representing migration in Museums,” 13-14.
45
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Museum’s difficulty in addressing colonialism is a reflection of construction of French identity
by the state. The national paradigm established by the state concerning identity does not allow
for the presence of colonial memory, nor the analysis of its effect on identity narratives.
Gouriévidis identifies this paradigm within the CNHI, which this thesis builds on to show how
the unsettled nature of colonialism in the museum is a reflection of identity construction in
France that positions itself in direct opposition to the hierarchical nature of colonialism. In
addition, Gouriévidis’s approach to the national paradigm and transcultural history provide key
conceptual considerations for how this paper addresses what seems to be at times conflicting
goals and outcomes within the Immigration Museum.48
Dominic Thomas marries the nature of multiculturalism and colonialism debates with the
memory of empire in his work Africa and France. With a focus on the omnipresence of empire
in French society, he shows how this manifests through everything from political engagement
and foreign policy to the creation of new state sponsored museums, like the CNHI.49 This work
builds on Thomas’s to highlight how political rhetoric from national leaders can be tied to the
museum as a representation of the unsettled relationship between colonialism, immigration and
identity that is manifested at the museum. Thomas highlights the museum in his text, utilizing it
as an example of the omnipresence of empire and the contentious nature of its presence in
political life and rhetoric.50 Thomas’s exploration of the CNHI grounds this paper’s assertions
that immigration, identity, and Frenchness as concepts are muddled and tied to interpretations of
France’s colonial past.51 In addition, his work helps to tie together the different forms of
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decolonization that are at play in the museum. Decolonization of colonies, the process by which
colonies separated themselves from colonizing countries and the disintegration of empire on an
official scale, often through independence movements, is a key factor in the discussions about
immigration, race, and identity. 52 In the case of museums, decolonization is the reframing and
expanding of perspectives with in museum spaces, and often making the explicit connection
between empire and the creation and funding of museums. In addition, for many museums, it is
sharing authority with those whose voices were absent from museums previously.53
Thomas’s edited work Museums in Post-Colonial Europe further supports the assertion
that the museum is a microcosm of the unsettled relationship between colonialism and identity,
and reflective of the two decolonization processes which are intertwined in the museum. This
thesis utilizes Thomas’s exploration of the goals of the museum as an educational, cultural
institution, as well as the language used to describe its impetus, which he notes are muddled,
confused and at times in conflict.54 By building on this assertion this paper shows that the
museum cannot fully address colonial memory under current identity constructions, thus that the
goals and the reality of the museum would be in conflict is not a surprise, but an inevitability. In
addition, the exploration of the nation and the Other within both the political and museological
context asserts where the museum’s attempts at history without a decolonial lens have failed to
address that the museum itself is the extension of a construction and celebration of colonialism in
physical form.
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Museums in Post-Colonial Europe, and more specifically the articles of Mary Stevens
and Dominic Thomas ground this paper’s assertion that the Immigration Museum functions as a
reflection of greater political and social concerns about identity and immigration. Their tracing of
the formation of the museum and its direct connection to its contemporary political landscape are
a reflection of the thesis of this paper and provide necessary background and context to this
argument.55 Stevens argues that the presence of the Immigration Museum at the Palais de la
Porte Dorée highlights the lack of a museum that explicitly contends with French colonialism. 56
While in agreement with Stevens, this paper connects the disregard for the colonial past as an
extension and inevitability of the state construction of French identity. In addition, it focuses
more specifically on the periods of 2007 and 2014 under different administrations as key
moments in which the conundrum of the unsettled relationship between colonialism and identity
is exemplified, with immigration as a link between the two. These articles focus on the opening
of the museum and the museum as a general reflection of tensions between the colonial past and
political rhetoric that utilizes immigration and republican identity.57 The two moments I’ve
chosen highlight how rhetoric and support for the museum changed with different
administrations, but that the inability to fully address colonial memory and its relationship to
identity and immigration was a constant. The invocation of the cohesive French identity under
republican ideals is consistent under both administrations, how they each understand
immigration to form a part of that identity narrative differs.
Colonial Imagery and Changing Dynamics
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Robert Aldrich’s Colonial Museums in Postcolonial Europe, establishes how the Palais
de la Porte Dorée became a museum and responded to changes in attitudes toward French
colonials during the post-colonial period. His work connects the current Immigration Museum to
the history of the building in which it resides, thus tying my arguments about the museum back
to the place that contributes so much to its conflicted nature. He focuses on the bas-relief on the
outside of the building as well as the Salle de Fêtes as sites in which the colonialism and
France’s mission civilisatrice are still apparent, but little analysis or recognition beyond their art
history significance is given to them by the museum.58 He further contextualizes the restructuring
of the museums in the Palais de la Porte Dorée within a larger international context of colonial
museums contending with changing colonial dynamics.59 As a result, his work addresses how
post-colonial attitudes were reinforced, or at least interconnected, across a variety of museums.60
The relational nature of the memory of colonialism in France and museums helps to reinforce or
oppose colonial memory, at times resulting in opposition and conflicting narratives in the
museums themselves.61 This further exemplifies the multi-positional nature of museums in
postcolonial Europe that must contend with colonial memory, whether it be in art, history, or
ethnography.
This thesis builds on Aldrich’s work to explore how the Immigration Museum is faced
with a conundrum, exploring the multiplicity of people that make up France while still adhering
to the state construction of identity. By analyzing the rhetoric of political leaders during key
moments of change for the museum, the relationship not only between the state and museum is
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made clear, but the shadow and memory of colonialism is exemplified. In addition, Aldrich’s
work serves as a reminder that the Immigration Museum is not the only museum in France to
struggle with addressing the colonial past, but that it is a reflection of larger state and societal
preoccupations with identity formation and the role of the Other as an oppositional figure to
French republicanism.
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Chapter Two
The Museum as a Manifestation of Colonial Celebration and Forgetting
The history of the physical site of the Musee de l’Histoire de l’Immigration at the Palais
de la Porte Dorée begins with the Exposition Coloniale Internationale, or the World’s Fair of
1931. With exhibits from, France, its colonies, and various countries, the world’s fair was meant
to celebrate France’s colonial power and exploits. The exhibition was a celebratory event that
highlighted how France saw its colonies as producers of resources and France itself as the
purveyor of the mission civilisatrice, the civilizing mission.62 The palais was the only permanent
building constructed at the site on the edge of Bois de Vincennes for the world’s fair, and the
physical building acted as a continued celebration of France’s colonial exploits.
The celebration of colonialism was not only present in the exhibition as an event, but in
the Palais de la Porte Dorée itself. The entire façade of the building is a bas-relief that displays
the colonies’ contributions to France and France’s positive contributions to the colonies.63 The
bas-relief portrays Marseilles and Bordeaux as the entry point and the doorway between the
colonies and metropolitan France.64 This façade with its explicit celebration of colonialism,
showing stylized colonized figures that are toiling for empire, completing “agriculture, artisanal,
or mining work, happily offering both their labor and products to France.”65 The bas-relief,
designed by well know sculptor Alfred Janniot, shows African and South Asian figures picking
and carrying produce. The scenes are mixed with flora and fauna, promoting a harmonious and
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sanitized image of the colonies, that gives no indication of the violence and exploitation that was
the reality of colonialism.66 The bas-relief is still on the exterior of the building and has been a
point of contention throughout its history as other museums have come and gone in the space.

Fig. 1. Bas-relief on exterior of the Musée National de l’Histoire de l’Immigration, designed by Alfred Janniot. Photograph:
October 2015.67

This physical display for the Palais de la Porte Dorée has meant that colonialism is not
only imbued in its walls, but in its context. The palais is both a physical representation of
France’s “civilizing mission” in its colonies, but also within Paris itself, as the general
commissioner of the Exposition Coloniale and former colonial administrator Hubert Lyautey
declared his intention to “‘haussmannize’ and reform the largely communist area in eastern
Paris.”68 The palais is both representative of the colonial exhibition and what was intended after
the fact; continuing to promote French colonialism in visual and pedagogical form in the
métropole. This is furthered by the fact that the museum was quite literally the Museum of the
Colonies and Museum of Overseas France for nearly thirty years.
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The Exposition Coloniale closed in the fall of 1931 and a few months later the Colonial
Museum, which became Musée de la France d’Outre-mer opened.69 The museum was a
continuation of the original colonial exhibition with its celebration of France’s civilizing mission
in its colonies. The choice to maintain the colonial museum was not surprising, in that postWorld War I France was coalescing its colonial identity and colonies. The colonial exhibition
which had celebrated a France around the world, at least in terms of land, created a national
identity that expanded far beyond the métropole.70 Even with the political pushback from
communist and socialist parties, the colonialism of France was celebrated and understood to be
key to the French nation.71 The Musée de la France d’Outre-mer’s opening as an extension of the
colonial exhibition was predicated on this. It was reflective of the understanding that France was
more than its European borders, often referred to as the hexagon, and that its civilizing mission
and colonialism were key to empire. Geppert states the goals of the world’s fair were far more
extensive than a display of colonialism, stating “the exposition explicitly aimed at infusing the
French public with a colonial consciousness, a mentalité coloniale otherwise considered
dreadfully missing.”72 The museum therefore was not only a representation of colonialism
intended for the short period of the world exposition, but a continuous physical manifestation of
the desire to infuse the French public of métropole with a colonial consciousness. The museum

Étienne Féau, “L’art Africain Au Musée Des Arts d’Afrique et d’Océanie: Collections et Perspectives Pour Le Musée Du Quai
Branly (African Art in the Musée Des Arts d’Afrique et d’Océanie, a Brief History of the Collections and the Prospects for the
New Museum of Arts and Civilizations),” Cahiers d’Études Africaines 39, no. 155/156 (1999): 924.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/4392987.
70 Sandrine Lemaire, “National History and Colonial History: Parallel Histories (1961–2006),” In Colonial Culture in France
since the Revolution, edited by Sandrine Lemaire, Pascal Blanchard, Nicolas Bancel, and Dominic Thomas, (Indiana University
Press, 2014), 257-258. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt16gh82z.40.
71 Lemaire, “National History and Colonial History,”257-258.
72 Geppert, Fleeting Cities, 195.
69

22

focused on the development of the French empire over time, indigenous art that has inspired
French art and culture, and agriculture and minerals.73
While this celebration of French colonialism was possible in the 1930s and through the
Second World War, as more French colonies gained independence and or autonomy, the
celebratory nature of a colonial museum seemed at odds with current political and cultural
events. Colonial museums more generally were suffering from a lack of funding and visitor ship,
which resulted in closures. The minister of cultural affairs, Andre Malraux redirected the
museum in 1960 towards a less explicitly colonial theme.74 An eclectic character known for
everything from trying to steal statues from Angkor Wat to anti-fascist activities in Spain, he was
appointed minister of Cultural Affairs under President Charles de Gaulle with the charge of
making great works of mankind accessible to the French public and to encourage the creation of
art.75 He proposed an art museum of non-European/non-western art, with the purpose of
aestheticizing non-western art, elevating the status of the collections of the museum from
artefacts to high art.76 That he proposed an art museum, versus a history or ethnographic
museum, prevented perceived competition with ethnographic museums like Musée de
l’Homme.77 Malraux’s emphasis on the artistic value of the collections without addressing their
colonial roots was part of a larger erasure of the colonial nature of La Porte Dorée. The move
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away from celebrating the colonial nature and roots of the museum was reflective of France’s
own disconnection from its colonial past as it lost its official control over the colonies.
The transition from the Musée de la France d’Outre-Mer to the Musée des Arts africains
et océaniens (MAAO) reflected this slow disconnect that did not address colonialism, but simply
distanced it from the museum collection and narrative. This transition from an explicitly colonial
museum to an implicitly colonial museum was certainly not accidental and the progression
reflects France’s conundrum of how to address colonialism as an indelible part of French identity
and history. When the colonial museum opened, France was not only in a celebratory colonial
period, they were fusing their empire and identity. As independence movements grew and were
successful the celebratory nature of the colonial museum was at odds with current realities. In
the case Palais de la Porte Dorée, it was not only the collection, but the building itself that was a
celebration of colonialism. When it reopened as the MAAO, much of the outright celebratory
colonial art had been put into the archives and the hall of colonialist murals had been closed
off.78 This did not change that the collections were still colonial in scope or that the museum
rarely addressed the colonial nature of its collection. The MAAO instead became an art museum
to celebrate non-western art and artifacts, but rarely interrogated their legacy.
The political nature of the transition to the MAAO speaks to France’s on-going struggle
with its colonial past and the way in which it emerges in French identity and culture. The
combination of the lack of interrogation of the colonial past, the civilizing narrative, and the
universalism of the present, has made it difficult to address the ways in which colonialism and
racism are still embedded in French society and affect French citizens. As Bancel and Blanchard
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explain, “To tarry with the issue of colonization is necessarily to deconstruct the discourse that
legitimated it, the colonial-Republican discourse. The latter constitutes one of the most firmly
anchored political and identity-related points of reference in the collective political imaginary.”79
In the case of the MAAO to address colonialism would have meant deconstructing that which
formed the museum in the first place, its collection and the collection’s subsequent entry into
French patrimony.80 Acknowledging the hierarchical and exploitative nature of colonialism
would not only have challenged the existence of the museum, but the republican approach to
French identity. The MAAO was certainly not a sole purveyor of this erasure of colonialism, but
the lack of discussion about it in such an explicitly colonial space was a disservice to the objects
in their collection and the history of the site as a whole. This history has followed the collection
to Quai Branly, where it was moved in 2006 when the museum was opened as a collection of
“premier arts.” Quai Branly has also been criticized for its lack of a comprehensive lens on
colonialism.81 A pet project of President Jaques Chirac who “admired and collected what some
collectors and dealers were still calling ‘l’arte primitif,’” the museum was meant to memorialize
his presidency and leadership over the course of two terms.82 With the support and help of his
art-dealer friend Jaques Kerchache, he ordered the construction of the museum, which would
eventually bring together collections from multiple ethnographic art collections, including the
MAAO and Musée de l’Homme to create a singular museum focused on non-western/nonEuropean art.83
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Thus, like other museums that have focused on non-western/non-European aspects in
France, the opening of the MAAO sat at the crux of questions about identity and colonialism.
After World War I the colonial project of France was propagandized by politicians across party
lines who saw the need for a French Empire.84 As scholars Blanchard, Lemaire, Bancel, and
Thomas note, France utilized universalist principles to justify its colonialism, pointing to its
legitimacy and superiority as justification for its mission civilisatrice. In affect colonialism
became humanitarian to maintain the republican, universalist narrative of France.85 Under empire
France had promoted a national identity, a national unity, and, a singular entity that was
composed of both the métropole and the colonies.86 This republican based narrative only held
true however when the colonies and métropole were separate, the hierarchical nature of
colonialism maintained. As Blanchard et. al notes, “A palpable contradiction was to be found in
the press, with its regular campaigns against these ‘undesirables’ who were often considered a
threat to the nation’s unity when in the metropole, whereas the colonies themselves were seen as
essential in fortifying the nation’s power and its unity.”87 Thus France’s national narrative
predicated itself on mythologizing republicanism that spoke of unity, while simultaneously
maintaining explicitly racist and xenophobic discourse towards the colonies that formed their
empire. In addition, the idea of a singular France was pushed by politicians across party lines,
linking the métropole and France d’Outre-mer.88
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With French colonies gaining independence or autonomy, the narrative of a larger
national France switched from one that celebrated and aggrandized empire to a process of
forgetting. In effect, as Lebovics states, France wanted to be able to “start again.”89 The political
and social forgetting of empire was apparent in the MAAO as an institution, with its collections
and administrative direction coming under “Direction des Musées de France and the Ministry of
Culture, as a way to symbolically “absorb” them a second time (the first symbolic gesture being
their translocation) and affirm their inalienable place as part of French national assets of cultural
heritage.”90 In addition, when the former Musée des Colonies transitioned into being the MAAO
under Andre Malraux, the museum transitioned into an artistic focus which downplayed the
history of colonialism both in the space and the collection, even as the museum still maintained
an emphasis on the Other. The Salle des Fêtes remained closed to the public and labels
downplayed the role of colonialism in the acquisition of the pieces.91 The MAAO’s focus on the
Other through art and ethnography reflected the process of colonial amnesia in France by which
the country was able to continue to exotify the Other without contending with the clear
implications of empire in the collections and in French society at large. In the same way that the
country reformed what constituted France, the museum reconstituted what was colonial about
their collection. When the collections of the MAAO moved to Musée Quai Branly, which
opened in 2006, Palais de la Porte Dorée became home to the newly minted Centre National de
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l’Histoire de l’Immigration (CNHI), a project that would encounter its own difficulties in the
space as it has navigated the colonial past, memory, and the construction of French identity.

Fig. 2. Former Salle des Fêtes, now known as Le Forum, Musée National de l’Histoire de L’Immigration. Photograph:
November 2017.92

From Colonization to Immigration and the Implications of Memory
The impetus for the creation of the Musee National de l’Histoire de l’Immigration did not
come out of a singular event. Instead, the basis for the museum was formed over a period of ten
years, with inspiration coming from academic focus on memory and identity in France that had
gained support since the 1980s. The question of immigration is a contentious one in France for a
variety of reasons, notwithstanding a general opposition to immigrants. Immigration is a stand in
for race and ethnicity in France, meaning that any conversation about immigration has racial and
ethnic components, even if they are unspoken. This is a reflection of the universalist approach to
identity, as immigration takes on a racialized and colonial nature, but that nature is not explicitly
named, allowing for immigration to appear neutral as a term. As both Lotem and Thomas state in
varying forms, both immigration and “remembering empire” are euphemisms for race and racial
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politics.93 Not only does the use of immigration or colonialism in place of race support a
universalist narrative in France, it provides a simpler definition of what it means to be French,
thus creating explicit divides between those who are and those who are not. In the case of
immigration standing in for race and identity, it disengages immigration from colonialism, thus
obscuring the lengthy history between countries of origin and France.
France’s history with previous colonies is a defining characteristic of discussions about
immigration as the perception of Frenchness and identity are deeply embedded in how
immigration is defined socially and politically. As noted by Dominic Thomas and Alec
Hargreaves, immigration functions as a metaphorical representation of race and identity in
France, and thus any conversations about immigration are also conversations about race,
religion, and identity.94 Like Thomas, Chin also asserts how immigration functions as a facet of
larger debates about multiculturalism, which are themselves referendums on definitions of
identity in Europe. That the majority of immigrants to France are from former colonies means
that the presence of colonial memory is salient and empire is never far away. Instead, colonial
memory haunts the discussions about immigration, an often-unspoken actor in the narrative that
is recognizable, but not named, reinforcing the republican narrative of a united and equal France
under law. As Blanchard et. al note the formation of identity in France during France’s
colonialism was predicated on a universalist approach to empire.95 And yet, under the current
national construction of identity, which still relies on a republican narrative, France is able to
avoid accusations of racism and xenophobia because the “essence” of its identity is an assumed
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equality in which all citizens are viewed the same in the eyes of the state. As Blanchard et. al
state this “incredibly powerful blind spot effectively discourages a real critique of the colonial
heritage in the construction of racism.”96 This blind spot is further exemplified by the memory
debates of the 1990s in which national narratives about the Algerian War for Independence were
challenged by academics like Benjamin Stora. The blind spot in relation to colonial heritage is
not only applicable to racism, but immigration as a form of continuity with the colonial past. As
Lotem notes, addressing colonial history in France first came through the lens of immigration. In
addition, a large number of immigrants to France are from former French colonies, highlighting
that France has never fully disengaged from the colonial past, even as the country engaged in
forgetting empire.97
Thus, the questions of immigration, citizenship, and identity are tied to the concept of
France as a singular and plural space. Immigration has always held a place in French
consciousness, because of its connection to France’s former colonies and the ways in which the
colonial past and immigration itself simultaneously challenge and reflect the construction of a
universalist French identity. The universalist reasoning used for empire, the mission civilisatrice
and the humanitarian responsibility are challenged by the reality of the ways in which colonial
subjects were treated and how immigration is racialized and used to justify increased state
surveillance of those deemed inassimilable. Nevertheless, the responses to immigration in France
have changed according to economic, racial, and social concerns, even as there has always been
the underlying presence of Empire. In the post-war era of the Trente Glorieuses, a thirty year
period following World War Two of significant economic growth, immigration was relatively
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welcome, with a significant numbers of people filling jobs in France.98 There was immigration
from both European nations, such as Spain, Portugal, and Italy, as well as colonies and former
colonies.99 Due to restrictions on visas and contracts for European immigrants, France turned to
their colonies, specifically Algeria and the DOM-TOM (Départements d'outre-mer, Territoires
d'outre-mer, overseas France), to fill a significant worker shortage post-war.100 Yet the nature of
the unequal colonial relationship between Algeria and France remained unchanged when
individuals came to France for work. Muslim Algerians were treated as second class citizens,
both at home and in mainland France, barred from full citizenship rights and treated with
suspicion on the basis of religion.101
The Algerian War for Independence (1954-1962) further complicated French identity,
both for those in Algeria and those in France. Prior to the war Algerians of non-European
descent were formally French nationals.102 After the war, they were considered immigrants, but
through the Évian Accords, afforded a transition period of five years which still allowed for
freedom of movement in and out of metropolitan France.103 The repatriation of pied noirs (a
person of European origin born in Algeria) meant that colonial dynamics continued in mainland
France post-war, as they were often employed directors over the living spaces of Algerian
workers due to their former experience with “foreigners.104 In addition pied noirs were never
referred to as immigrants, but known as repatriés.105 Even with the decolonization of Algeria and
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the changing relationship between the two countries, “France remained deeply reliant on wellestablished colonial networks to keep its economy supplied with willing laborers.”106 Hargreaves
expands on the conceptualization of immigration as France transitioned out being an official
colonial power. “Immigrés (immigrants) had come to be regarded as synonymous with
travailleurs immigrés (immigrant workers), who were in turn equated with unskilled workers
rather than professionally qualified personnel.”107 The term immigrant became further racialized
as the majority of unskilled workers were non-European, thus there was an explicit distinction
between immigrant and foreigner, which was used for Europeans.108This history of Algerian
immigrants in France and racialized parameters of the term immigrant helps to explain the
complexity of French citizenship and identity in both a colonial and post-colonial world. The
construction of separate identities even under citizenship is still replicated as immigration is not a
description of a singular experience, but a label which is carried intergenerationally and which
denotes what is French enough.
The memory debates, a term which refers to the academic and cultural discussion about
memory in France concerning the Algerian War for Independence and the Vichy Regime,
functioned as a retrospective on France’s relationship with its former colonies. With a significant
push for assimilation, and yet a simultaneous exclusion of immigrants from the DOM-TOM, the
colonial past was meant to be brushed under the rug. However, this caused consternation on
multiple fronts. To disconnect from the colonial past meant that France had wiped its hands of
colonial violence and even more recent systemic violence and torture by the French military
during the Algerian War for Independence.109 The systematic forgetting by the state, while not
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necessarily successful, encouraged a distancing that refrained from acknowledging the entirety of
French history and identity construction. French veterans of the war also wanted their
acknowledgement and organized themselves accordingly.110 However there still remained a lack
of officiality, which precipitated the memory debates.
Benjamin Stora, well known for his work as a historian on the Algerian War, drew clear
lines between France’s need to come to terms with its colonial past in Algeria and the Vichy
regime.111 In essence, the French public was aware of the past, of the violence, but the state had
engaged in various forms of forgetting that resulted in little public outrage or reflection.112 The
concept of the memory debate and the need for memorial justice gained support amongst both
academics and activists in France, utilizing much of the same language that was used in relation
to the memory of the Vichy Regime.113 Lotem highlights how the concept of the memory debate
was politicized, “The particularity of the French case for introspection was the focus on the
state’s duty to respect the memory of all its citizens in order to live up to a republican promise of
universalism.”114 Marginalized communities utilized the language of memory to assert both a
right to information, often archival, as well as their stories being told. This extended from the
Algerian War for Independence to October 17, 1961, with memory being used as a way to claim
political and cultural agency in French society.115
Memory serves as a key function of the museum, as individuals are both represented and
projected onto the museum. In addition, the demand for narratives that included the entirety of
the French population showcase how the memory debates, in tandem with the rise of political
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rhetoric of about immigrants more generally, were used as a basis for the creation of a museum
focused on immigration.116 The political shift to the right in the 1980s, and specifically the rise of
the Front National, with their nationalist and anti-immigrant platform, stymied early attempts at a
museum, even as immigration was used in political rhetoric about identity, economics, and social
expectations in French society.117 Socialist ministers supported the conversations in the 1990s
and early 2000s about the creation of an immigration museum. In attempting to address
immigration at both the individual level with singular stories, and at a national level, with an
emphasis on national identity, the conceptual rendering of the museum intended for it to be
larger in scope than solely a museum, functioning as an archive of information and media, and as
a site of research and pedagogical methodology. As a result, it would be a site for cultural and
pedagogical production about immigration, complicating the existing narratives and
spearheading conversations about immigration and identity in France.118 The goal was to create
interdisciplinary, inter-ministerial partnerships between the museum and government ministries
concerned with immigration, identity, and education.119 President Jacques Chirac, of the center
right party Union pour un mouvement Populaire (UMP), took up the mantle of the museum after
his second term election, in which he won by a landslide of more than eighty percent against
Front National leader Jean Marie Le Pen in 2002. The project was officially approved in 2004
under the direction of Jacques Toubon.120
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Toubon along with a team of researchers and historians, focused on creating permanent
and temporary exhibitions that explored immigration through a multiplicity of lenses and used
art and history to explore immigrant experiences.121 The permanent exhibition Repères
(Landmarks or Points of Reference) functioned as a thematic tapestry of immigration from the
nineteenth century onward in France. With themes such as, “A Place to Live,” “Land of
Welcome, Hostile France,” “Roots” and “Athletes” the museum approached the exhibition from
the perspective that “the people who have settled in France since the 19th century have
encountered the same hardships, undergone the same decisive experiences and held the same
hopes.”122 By approaching the question of immigration through an overarching shared
experience, the museum compressed the different experiences of migratory groups that were in
fact accepted and treated differently based on origin and the time period when they came to
France. However, in many ways this reflected the goal of Jacques Toubon’s 2004 report to Prime
Minister Raffarin, which expressed social cohesion and tolerance for integration as major
goals.123 In addition, by placing all immigrant experiences in the same categories and
trajectories, the museum reflected the republican and universalist lens through which France has
defined its citizens and constructed identity.
The exhibition utilized both historical objects, such as letters and identity cards, in
tandem with contemporary art, which forms a major part of the museum’s collection, to convey
the immigrant experience.124 The museum advocated for a subjective, aesthetic, and emotional
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interpretation of immigration, which can be seen in the contemporary art that is reflective of the
artists’ own reading of a migratory experience. The 2004 report by Toubon stated that the
museum favored artistic intervention for enhancing the themes outlined in the exhibition.125 The
report outlined a section of the exhibition that would have addressed colonialism and
decolonization, as well as the history of the Palais de la Porte Dorée, but over the course of the
planning process, both sections were reduced to “underscore the commensurability of all
experiences of stigmatization.”126 An early exception was a temporary exhibition on immigration
during the period of the colonial exhibition in 1931, which explored colonial imagery during the
World’s Fair. However, the museum has rarely explicitly addressed the links between
colonialism and immigration as a historical, historiographical, and social process. As Mary
Stevens notes, the exhibition succeeded in addressing the colonial imagery of the 1930s, but did
not address the “collective imaginary” that developed as a result of the colonial imagery and its
ongoing presence in France.127 Indeed, by focusing on the aesthetic and subjective nature of the
128

immigration experience for all immigrants, the migratory process is separated from the

political and historical implications that created the need to migrate in the first place. In addition,
the emphasis on a shared experience in the formation of the museum is indicative of the
overarching goal of promoting a national French identity which immigrants are able to
participate and contribute to, albeit in an existing construction of identity.
Chirac’s goal was that the museum would open in April 2007, before the end of his
presidential term. In doing so, he would be leaving a legacy of two state museums that explored
Jacques Toubon, “Rapport au Premier minister: Mission de Préfiguration du Centre de Ressources et de Mémoire de
l’Immigration,” (report to Prime Minister, Paris, 2004), 15.
126 Mary Stevens, “Still a Family Secret?,” 121.
Jacques Toubon, “Rapport au Premier minister: Mission de Préfiguration du Centre de Ressources et de Mémoire de
l’Immigration,” (report to Prime Minister, Paris, 2004), 66-67.
127 Mary Stevens, “Still a Family Secret?,” 120.
128 Green, “A French Ellis Island?,” 247.
125

36

conceptualizations of the Other and that hoped to contribute to the cultural life of France.129
Instead, the museum opened in October 2007 under the next president, Nicholas Sarkozy, who,
although from the same party as Chirac, had expressed explicitly anti-immigrant rhetoric and run
his campaign on the idea that national identity had been eroded.130 He and the Interior Minister
Brice Hortefeux, whose department was responsible for heritage sites including the immigration
museum, notably snubbed the opening event and left the museum uninaugurated.
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Chapter Three
Sarkozy’s Construction of Immigration, Identity and his Rebuff of the Colonial Past
Sarkozy’s approach to the museum was indicative of his approach to immigration and
colonial memory as a whole. His lack of support for the museum highlighted his existing antiimmigrant and assimilationist rhetoric, which was both exclusionary and colonial in scope. The
complexity of the museum as a site and as a cultural project attempting to explore the mosaic of
French identity and memory through immigration challenged Sarkozy’s rhetoric about identity
that was based in shared republican values. 131 Even as he and members of his administration
such as Brice Hortefeux and Eric Besson, argued that France had its roots in republican ideals,
there was still an emphasis on two seemingly contradictory elements of French identity, its
Christian aspects and laïcité.132 The first emphasized a historical France not associated with
immigration and the second emphasized the republican values which have often been used to
exclude those deemed as the Other due to racial, ethnic, cultural or religious background. The
rhetoric of the three men focused on the pride of being French and the expectation that those that
immigrated would assume French values and history as their own, assimilating to the cultural,
religious, and social norms of France.133
Sarkozy and Brice Hortefeux’s snubbing of the opening of a state sponsored museum
highlights how the museum served as an alternative narrative to Sarkozy’s assimilationist and
simplified identity rhetoric, and that their presence at its inauguration would have been seen as
tacit support for a national narrative that opposed their immigration and identity narrative.
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Immigration functions as an inherently political topic, not only because of the movement of
people, but because it’s imbued with politics of race and identity that are often not explicitly
named in France. Sarkozy’s speeches and writings leading up to his election and after his
inauguration highlight not only his approach to colonialism, identity, and immigration, but the
political climate in which the museum opened.
In July 2007 he gave a speech in Dakar, Senegal that received significant backlash, both
because of his suggestion that Africans had not really entered history and his suggestion that the
past Africans were nostalgic for was in fact a mythical imagining of the past, saying that the
problem of Africa was it “judged the present by the purity of the past that no one could hope to
revive.”134 In addition, he argued, without specifying countries, that while there had been
colonial violence in Africa, that France had not been all bad in its colonialism. He further argued
that not everyone (France) had exploited Africa. “The colonizer came and he took…he took, but
I’d like to say with respect, he also gave. He constructed bridges, roads, hospitals, dispensaries,
schools…He gave his pain, his work, his knowledge. Not all colonizers were thieves, not all
were exploiters.”135 Both quotes highlight Sarkozy’s rejection of repentance for French colonial
violence, as well as infantilization and generalization of the African continent. By placing
responsibility on the “youth of Africa” for their own setbacks, Sarkozy engaged in a practice of
colonial forgetting.136 This rhetoric, the separation between the experienced of the colonized and
France’s national memory of its own colonialism, functions as an extension and parallel to his
rhetoric on immigration, much in the same way that his construction of immigration and identity
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does not address the complexity of French history, colonial memory, and the changing borders
and definitions of France and Frenchness. Sarkozy’s explicit disconnection from the colonial
past was in conflict with the goals of the CNHI, even as colonial forgetting has overshadowed
the institution.
His interactions with the colonial past must be analyzed alongside his rhetoric on
immigration, as both reflect an understanding of a singular France that is not responsible for the
past and therefore the consequences of the present. In the speech in Dakar, he placed the
responsibility on “young Africans” to move beyond the nostalgia of the past and the wrongs
committed against their parents and grandparents, which he stated are not theirs, and commit to
change. By stating that “an Africa that would not change would be condemned to servitude,” he
was asking his audience to look to the future without addressing the past.137 These statements are
indicative of Sarkozy’s anti-repentance stance in regards to France’s colonialism, which in turn
were reflected in his interactions with the Immigration Museum, because it is both a reflection of
the colonial past and thus France’s role in the movement of the colonized, and the ongoing
relationships between the former colonies and France, as it pertains to culture and identity.
Even under the colonial shadow of Palais de la Porte Dorée, the museum addresses the
complexities of immigration with the goal of maintaining a national narrative.138 For Sarkozy to
acknowledge the museum as a national, state sponsored entity by inaugurating it, he would have
legitimized the museum’s attempts at complicating the history of immigration in France and thus
the fabric of identity in France. An inauguration would have given credence to the museum’s
approach to French identity and French history, which acknowledges the contributions of
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immigrants and the complexity of migration. There is a specific complexity in the idea of the
national narrative and paradigm, as the CNHI during Sarkozy’s tenure did not make specific
aims to disrupt the national narrative of Frenchness. Immigrants are subsumed into the national
identity of France, with the end goal being “republican integration.”139 Integration is not wholly
antithetical to Sarkozy’s identity constructions, but the process by which that identity is
constructed is complicated at the museum. Integration by the museum’s standards contrasts
significantly with Sarkozy’s conceptualizations of Frenchness and the colonial past.140 The
museum legitimizes discussion and connection between immigration and colonialism, the
violence perpetuated by the French state, and complexity of identity in France, not only by
inhabiting the former colonial museum, but by discussing immigrants that came to France under
colonial conditions. Even without directly addressing the colonial past, the museum’s presence at
the Palais de la Porte Dorée demands that the colonial past be addressed, whether through
critique of the museum or within the museum itself. The building serves as a reminder of the
colonial past which haunts identity and immigration narratives. By not inaugurating the
museum, Sarkozy refrained from legitimizing an institution that was contrary to his and many
others’ understandings of immigration and identity, which was exemplified by his creating
actively anti-immigrant institutions during his time in office.141
The clearest form of delegitimizing the goal of the museum and its content was Sarkozy’s
creation of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Codevelopment upon
his taking office in the spring of 2007. A promise he made during his campaign, the ministry was
explicitly in contrast to the museum’s attempt to complicate the nature of migration and identity,
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instead focusing on controlling migration flows and constructing narratives about selected versus
uninvited immigrants.142 Concerns about immigration were not new to Sarkozy’s campaign and
administration. From the 1970s onwards French concern and distain for immigration has
fluctuated, with inflammatory rhetoric and concern often being connected to economic and
political events, including but not limited to the Algerian Civil War in the 1990s, 9/11, the
numerous “veil affairs” in French schools that were seen as a challenge to universalism, and the
2005 banlieue uprisings.143 The ministry was the result of Sarkozy’s own rhetoric about
immigration, as well as his predecessors, building on his time as the Minister of the Interior
during the previous administration.
As the Minister of the Interior and as a political figure more generally he had vehemently
advocated against immigration on the basis of reunification and argued for the expulsion of
undocumented immigrants.144 As Özden Ocak notes in her article on the Ministry as a form of
performative sovereignty, “the policy of immigration subie—more than the selection of
economic immigrants —that was the main goal of Sarkozy’s immigration legislation.”145 The
construction of Immigration subie, or uninvited immigration by Sarkozy allowed him to focus on
unwanted immigration as a foil to national construction of identity. The ministry’s goal to
promote national identity was dependent on immigrants “respecting French values,” which in
reality meant assimilating to French values.146 When taken alongside Sarkozy’s consistently
inflammatory comments, which included referring to those engaging in the 2005 uprisings as
“racaille” (a racialized pejorative term) and that he would clean out a housing project with a
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“pressure washer,” the formation of the ministry exemplifies the French practice of
acknowledging French identity and immigration without addressing the omnipresence of
colonialism in both. 147
The inception of the ministry was so antithetical to the museum that numerous historians
that had been working on the museum project since 2003 resigned when Sarkozy announced the
ministry, citing that the connection that the ministry made between identity and immigration
created an implication of the “problem” of immigration for France and French people, effectively
associating the two concepts in the mind of the public with negative connotations.148 The
resignation of the historians shows how the museum was attempting to navigate the question of
identity, and simultaneously that they knew what did not represent their vision of identity. The
stark contrast in approach to identity and immigration from the ministry and the museum
exemplifies the unsettled nature of the relationship between the two in France, as well as how
both were used in political rhetoric by figures that had influence over the perception of
immigration politically and socially. In resigning from the museum, the historians were directly
responding to Sarkozy rhetorically connecting immigration and identity, without identifying why
connecting the two could be problematic, specifically without the historiographical inclusion of
colonialism.
Not only was the ministry intended to promote French identity, it would control
migration and utilize neo-colonialist approaches to immigration, focused on “competence.”149
The ministry was seen as a way of enforcing specific ways of being French and discouraging
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immigration. Later initiatives by the ministry including the “What is French?” townhall
discussions, which took inspiration from Sarkozy’s presidential campaign and its focus on
French identity and pride.150 The ministry was an extension of Sarkozy’s rhetoric that the French
identity was in crisis.151 The ministry was disbanded in 2010, but the anti-immigrant and identity
rhetoric was embedded in discussions of immigration at that point.152 Sarkozy reiterated support
for assimilation in 2011 stating, “We don't want a society in which communities co-exist
alongside each other. If you come to France, you agree to base yourself in a single community,
the national community. If you don't accept that, you don't come to France.”153 Indeed, the
question of French identity in the light of significantly more restrictive laws about religious garb,
head scarves in particular, and terrorist attacks, has meant that the rhetoric that Sarkozy utilized
to create an us vs. them dynamic concerning identity is still alive and well, a direct contrast to
the” their history is our history” narrative of the museum.154
The Immigration Museum as an Ideal of Diversity and Social Cohesion
President Francois Hollande’s relationship with the museum was quite different from
Sarkozy’s. The museum was officially inaugurated under Hollande just over seven years after it
first opened in October of 2007. The event, in which Hollande gave the inaugural speech,
intended to speak to the cultural and educational role of the museum for the French public.155
Hollande was supportive of less stringent immigration policies and his interior minister spoke
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out against Sarkozy’s “random and discriminatory” immigration policies.156 Even so his five
year presidency was marred by his administration’s handling of Romani immigrants, La Jungle
in Calais, and his non-fulfillment of the promise for non-citizens to vote, which contrasted
significantly with the positive and forward-looking tone of his inauguration speech.157
In 2013, the Romani fifteen-year-old Leonarda Dibrani and her family were deported
from France to Kosovo, with police taking Leonarda away during a school field trip.158 Hollande
extended an invitation to only Leonarda to return to France to study, excluding the rest of her
family from the possibility of return. This came after Interior Minister Manuel Valls supported
the expulsion of Romani people, arguing that their life was in “confrontation” with the French
way of life.159 Both instances were seen as a continuation of Sarkozy’s hardline policies against
Roma communities in France and antithetical to France’s commitment to human rights.160 Like
issue of the expulsion of Roma communities, the Jungle in Calais was a case of France being
questioned about its commitment to human rights and the treatment of immigrants. La Jungle is
located in Calais in northern France and functioned as an unsanctioned refugee camp for
migrants and refugees trying to cross the channel to Great Britain. The camp, which has had
multiple iterations, had nearly 10,000 individuals in 2016 when the Interior Minister Bernard
Cazeneuve, announced that the camp was slated for dismantling and clearing.161 The camp was a
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reflection of poor migration policies and services, and with major concerns about
unaccompanied minors, the camp was a point of shame and contention for France.162
In addition to advocating for less stringent immigration policies during his campaign,
which the above situations seemed to disprove and complicate, Hollande had been supportive of
legislation that would allow non-citizens to vote. The legislation that would have allowed nonEU citizens who had lived in France for more than five years to vote in municipal elections.163
However, in 2015 Prime Minister Manuel Valls stated that the vote was no longer a priority.164
These high-profile events that concerned immigration during Hollande’s term showcase the
fracture between his celebratory rhetoric of immigration during his inauguration speech for the
Immigration Museum and the reality for the most vulnerable of immigrants. In addition, the
events speak to how Sarkozy and Hollande utilized significantly different rhetoric during their
terms concerning immigration, which reflected in their interactions with the museum, but that
immigration and identity were still defined by republican notions of Frenchness that were
exclusionary.
While Sarkozy had ignored the museum as a historical and cultural state institution,
Hollande emphasized the importance of the Immigration Museum in his speech, indicating that it
was a “place of research and space to discuss” as well as being “an expression of diversity and
the multiplicity of all immigration.”165 By highlighting the museum as an expression of diversity
and its multi-faceted nature, Hollande was touting it as a cultural institution that exemplified an
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ideal of what the conversation between immigration and identity could look like, even as his own
administration struggled to fulfill his ideal vision that he outlined in his speech. In addition, by
highlighting its multifaceted use, Hollande was celebrating the institution as a site that could be
central to engagement with immigration and history, versus being relegated to the sidelines of
immigration and identity discussions, except to function as a foil.
Hollande attempted to address the history of immigration in France, emphasizing how
immigrants have contributed to France. He specifically cited the Trente Glorieuses, a thirty-year
period of significant economic growth and development post-World War Two. 166 Indeed,
Hollande historicized his speech, pointing out that the movement to stop immigration to France
was relatively recent, and that it was not a French value to be so insular.167 It is here that
Hollande dove more readily into the debates about colonialism. Whereas his predecessor had
avoided the colonial past in his infamous speech in Dakar, Hollande made an attempt to
acknowledge the historical relationship between France and its colonies. As noted previously,
colonialism and immigration are intertwined in France conceptually, politically, historically, and
culturally. The majority of immigrants that come to France are from former French colonies and
France has consistently relied on its former colonies for labor, even after the colonies became
independent nations.168 As a result who has been considered French has changed based on both
location and time in France, as well as religion and ethnicity because of the legal and colonial
relationship between France and its colonies. Immigration functions as a stand in for discussions
about xenophobia and race, used in place of the words but it is imbued with their meaning.169
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Therefore, when one is discussing immigration in France it is racialized in concept and
understanding, but not necessarily linguistically.170 Hollande noted that the “empire came to save
France” during the World Wars and explicitly discussed colonial contributions to the war effort,
stating, “they fought for France, for a certain future, for a universal France, a France open to the
world.”171 Hollande does not explicitly address the memory debates that were the impetus for the
museum, but his invocation of the colonial past picks at the edge, using memory on the part of
the museum to both explain the past and to connect narratives.
Hollande’s invocations of colonialism, decolonization, and immigration speak to a
significantly different rhetorical approach from his predecessor.172 Whereas Sarkozy had resisted
acknowledging colonialism, using responsibility and the idea that not all colonizers were
exploitative, as seen in his 2007 speech in Dakar, Hollande embraced the use of the words like
colonial, immigration, memory, and contribution in his inaugural speech. By utilizing language
which linked immigration to the colonial past, he was stepping into the unsettled conversation
about their relationship and therefore the greater conversation of what constituted French identity
historically and in the contemporary moment.173 Hollande cites numerous instances in which
discrimination and integration mark the historical record, including, the Dreyfus Affair, the
Algerian War, and violence of the 1960s and 1970s, noting that the violence was cyclical and
reoccurring.174 With the addition of commentary on the importance of schools as an equitable
and accessible space and discrimination around employment and training, Hollande put historical
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realities in conversation with the ideas of discrimination and integration, thereby acknowledging
the connection between the colonial past and the reality of the immigration experience and
integration.175 Even with the choice of a more specific and historically accurate vocabulary,
Hollande’s invocations still maintained an expectation of a significant degree of integration on
the part of immigrants, referencing laïcité, as being a way of life in France and a way of
respecting one another.176 Utilizing laïcité showcases how Hollande continued to uphold national
and political paradigms about immigrants, even if the language was more positive and nuanced
than his predecessor. The museum functions in a similar fashion, exploring immigration through
historical and artistic renderings, but ultimately still upholding a national identity and paradigm
that has not shown a significant shift in definition.
Hollande linked the museum to the political and cultural identity of France as he
extrapolated on the “threat of communautarisme,” while also discussing racism and antisemitism
in France.177 Under universalist principles in France a bifurcated identity is not possible, which
helps to explain why France has such difficulty with discussing immigration, race, and identity
as official, systemic aspects of French society. While Hollande refrains from using the word
assimilation, the use of the word communautarisme suggests that there is still a belief in
intentional separation that is distinct from the colonial history and racism that permeates French
society, especially in regards to the banlieues. Rarely does this acknowledge that many economic
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migrants were intentionally placed in separate neighborhoods or that French society’s
expectation of assimilation is alienating for many citizens that are in fact French.178
Towards the end of his inauguration speech Hollande mentioned “the charge of the state
is to guarantee cohesion.”179 While much of the language that he used in the speech highlighted
immigration and colonialism were far more nuanced than his predecessor, a cohesive France and
identity was still the goal. This language and trajectory of speech is reflective of the museum
itself, both as a state entity and as a museological space. While the museum’s expressed goal in
the 2004 official report from Jacques Toubon, the first director, to the Prime Minister Raffarin,
was to explore the multiple dimensions of immigration in France, the museum still expresses
cohesion and pride in French identity as an explicit goal.180 Thus, Hollande’s language both
showed the museum as an ideal space for more difficult conversations about identity and
immigration in France, while simultaneously maintaining status quo. As the museum is meant to
represent all immigration to France and function in some ways as a history of France, the
underlying message of cohesion is still in line with the French approach to immigration and
integration.
Hollande’s speech at the Immigration Museum functions as a moment on France’s path
towards acknowledging race, colonization and identity as intertwined aspects of French society
and history that in fact have significant effects on all citizens. While much of the political
rhetoric still shies away from acknowledging race, religion, ethnicity, and migratory status as
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systemic entities which are defining aspects in French society, Hollande’s approach at the
Immigration Museum suggests an administrative turn towards all facets of French society
exploring the nuances of diversity and identity. Educational institutions have predominately
taken on this role in France, with the public school being the place where French citizens are
formed in the image of universalism and republicanism.181 Hollande energetically suggested in
the speech that the charge of addressing diversity and guaranteeing social cohesion is not only
the role of educational institutions, but all public institutions and public enterprises.182 In
suggesting such, Hollande brought the tumultuous topic of diversity to the forefront of politics
and suggested that it must be addressed socially and culturally.
More recent events, have continued to nudge French society into more urgent
conversations about race, colonialism and identity through post-colonial and multidisciplinary
lenses. Hollande’s use of the Immigration Museum to suggest all public institutions have a part
to play inserted the museum into public consciousness, as a necessary component of exploring
large social and cultural questions while also promoting social cohesion.183 For a museum that
was effectively ignored, deliberately, by the previous administration, Hollande’s assertion is a
reminder that the museum is a state entity and that he saw the museum as a way to advance
national narratives and goals for cohesion. As a cultural center focused on a heavily politicized
topic for France, the museum had the potential, according to Hollande, to contribute to
conversations about identity, and ultimately cohesion under French republicanism.184 As the
only state sponsored Immigration Museum in Europe, the fact that the museum had up to this
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point very little pull in the political and social arena, speaks to the complexity of its formation
and location.185 Hollande was effectively suggesting in his speech that the museum take on the
interlocuter role between those that have immigrated or have connections to that history, and the
French public at large. While this has been its charge since its inception in the early 2000s, its
lack of funding and location, along with the conundrum of addressing the colonial past in
relation to the national construction of identity leaves the museum in an unsettled, conflicted
state in public consciousness.
The Museum and the Historian as Political Actors in Changing Conversations about
Immigration
Hollande used the museum as an example of hope for integration within France, which is
both political and social in scope.186 The nature of integration and assimilation cannot be
separated from political and cultural policies. Therefore, the aspirational nature of the museum is
both political and cultural in nature, working towards a unified French identity. The idea of an
integrated France, an assimilated France, is not solely Hollande’s. Sarkozy has also argued
vehemently for assimilation.187 Both of their arguments are indicative of the longstanding
construction of national identity that is grounded in republicanism. As Blanchard et. al note the
idea of the republican French identity stretches across the political spectrum and has been
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utilized to justify colonialism, as well as formed the basis for colonial forgetting.188 Thus the
concept of a universal France does not change much between the two administrations, because it
is a necessary construction to maintain the republican identity that France considers one of its
defining aspects. Instead, the change in rhetoric reflects the extent to which they are willing to
engage in the unsettled debates about identity, colonialism and the meaning of integration for the
French state. Hollande’s inauguration speech for the museum spent significantly more time
speaking about France generally in relation to integration, history, and social cohesion, than the
museum itself. But perhaps this suggests that the museum is inherently present in these
conversations because it is of the state and of the people simultaneously. Hollande’s statement
that the museum is a representation of the hope for integration, acknowledges diversity and
speaks to the museum’s narrative of the multiplicity of immigrants that contributed to the current
construction of French national identity. Thus, the museum functions both as a space for past
stories, but also as a present backdrop for discussions about individuals’ interactions with
national identity and integration.189
The museum functioning as a microcosm of the political and cultural discussion in
French society at large continued with the appointment of Benjamin Stora as the President of the
Orientation Council of the museum in 2014. Stora’s involvement with the museum up to that
point had been extensive, in part because of his contributions to the memory debates of the
1990s. His work on colonialism and memory precipitated many of the discussions that would
eventually result in the museum.190 He was also involved as an expert from the inception of the
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museum, thus highlighting how the memory debates of the academy would eventually play out
in spaces more accessible to the general public.191 The nomination of Stora by the Minister of
Culture Françoise Nyssen, was intended to reflect that France was moving towards addressing
the cultural identity of immigrants, with the press release noting that “actions implemented today
and the investment of cultural actors in this field, are already exceptional and must be valued,
strengthened and extended.” 192 In addition, his appointment was seen as “giving the museum
stature and vigor.”193 The emphasis on cultural actors in the press release from the Ministry of
Culture suggests that Stora brought value as an academic and public intellectual who had worked
extensively on aspects that contribute to cultural identity, such as memory.194
In an interview for the museum’s ten-year anniversary in 2017, Stora recounted how he
had come to focus on the history of immigration, his perceptions of the field, and how he viewed
his appointment as the President of the Orientation Council. Stora explained that he considered
there to be a confluence between immigration history and French history which was ultimately
reflective of malleable identity and geographic borders.195 Stora emphasized his role as a
historian, or as he put it, “a very engaged historian,” noting that he came to immigration history
through his involvement in concerned citizens movements and his roles in organizations such as
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the association Générique, an early advocate of the Immigration Museum.196 That François
Hollande asked Stora to be the new President of the Orientation Council, reflected not only
Hollande’s awareness of academic debates that led to the creation of the museum, which Stora
stated in his interview, but that Stora’s approach was the preferred path forward for the museum.
Stora also noted that Hollande acknowledged the October 17th, 1961 massacre of Algerian
protestors as his first official engagement as president, which speaks to Hollande’s attempts to
engage with colonial memory, immigration, and colonial forgetting during his presidency.197
In a September 2014 interview with Le Monde, Stora was asked about the museum’s maladjusted presence in French society. Stora acknowledged that this was the case and explained
that the reason was political.198 As the incoming head of the museum, Stora fully understood the
political positioning of the museum, whether that was that the museum was not promoted and
ignored, or the promotion of social cohesion through integration rhetoric, as it would be in
December of that year during the inauguration. Stora outlined the conceptual difficulties of
immigration in France, with many French citizens forgetting or not acknowledging their
immigrant roots, and those referred to as immigrants wanting to cast off the moniker.199 In his
2017 interview he also highlighted how the descendants of immigrants, who are French and live
in France, live like foreigners, referring to how the immigration or the perception of immigration
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status is used to other and stigmatize individuals, calling it “one hell of a problem.”200 This
observation points to how immigration is viewed more generally in France and how immigration
is imbued with racial, religious, and ethnic connotations that affect not only immigrants
themselves, but anyone who is perceived as an Other. Stora was also asked during the interview
about Hollande’s approach to certain immigration measures, including allowing foreigners to
vote.201 That this was asked in an interview about his position for the Immigration Museum
shows how contemporary immigration concerns are intertwined with the history of immigration,
suggesting that the museum should be able to address both. The museum has struggled at times
to present immigration as both a historical and contemporary process that has political, social,
and cultural implications for immigrants and their descendants. In addition, both his and
Hollande’s support for changing voting laws suggested a change from the previous
administration concerning immigration, with the museum functioning as a conduit to discuss
these changes.
Both Hollande and Stora use the museum to engage with and connect current political
concerns about immigration with its history, suggesting that they see the museum as inherently
connected to political discourse occurring at a national level between politicians and their
constituents. The museum functions as a conduit through which to approach the concerns,
because it functions as a physical representation of the complexity of immigration and identity
questions. During the 2014 interview, Stora was also asked about a relationship between the
Ministry of Education and the museum, which also speaks to the museum functioning as a
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political and social entity in France, outside of its solely museological function. Stora’s
suggestion that the museum “should follow this direction,” indicated that the museum should
hold a more prominent social, cultural, and ultimately political role in French society,
functioning as a resource and starting point for discussions.202 Stora’s 2017 interview confirmed
his belief in the political role of the museum, stating he considered his acceptance of the role as
“a logical transition from the academic route to the political route,” which only strengthened his
assertions that historians must be engaged and political in their work.203 In addition, his assertion
that his role as the director was political implied that the museum itself was a political entity
through which to address the conceptualization of immigration and immigrants in France.
Stora’s goals for the redesign of the permanent exhibition extrapolated on the point of
conceptualization, as he wanted to “make sure the immigrant is not the subject, but an actor in
this history.”204 Stora’s appointment to the position was indicative of both an administration and
institution that were working towards a more central role in addressing immigration as both a
historical and contemporary process. Stora’s assertion that the redesign should address the postcolonial generation, in this case, the descendants of immigrants, and speak to the genealogy of
immigration, highlights how he viewed immigration not only as a historical phenomenon, but a
larger political and social concern that could be addressed by the museum.205 Indeed, by making
immigrants actors in the history of the museum, versus subjects, addressing how colonialism and
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the construction of identity are key to their history, and by extension France’s, becomes all that
much more important. Stora’s statement “how to live together is a burning question in France,”
further highlighted the unsettled nature of national identity, Frenchness, and colonial memory in
France and the museum.206 The implication that living together as a cohesive society is difficult
highlights the constraints of the republican model of identity that both the state and the museum
subscribe to. In effect, Stora’s suggestion that the museum is the place for conversations about
the genealogy of immigration could be extended to address and question the parameters of the
state construction of identity.
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Chapter Four
Acknowledging and Interrogating the Colonial Past with an Eye to the Future
The Musée National de l’Histoire de l’Immigration is not the only museum, nor state
institution, that has started to dip its toe into addressing the colonial past, and by extension the
national construction of French identity. Current French president Emmanuel Macron has
engaged in more explicit confrontations with colonialism than his predecessors, including
promising the temporary or permanent repatriation of African heritage to their respective
countries.207 Macron commissioned what would become the Sarr Savoy report on repatriation of
objects in France’s national collections.208 The report produced by Bénédicte Savoy and Felwine
Sarr, an art historian and economist respectively, explored the power dynamics of collections and
colonialism, arguing that repatriation could establish balance between former colonies and
colonial powers.209 Focusing on French collections, the report suggested that any objects that had
a suspect provenance, or they were obtained under violent and unethical conditions, should be
returned to their country of origin, even if it was not France that had committed the violence.210
While the report is not applicable to the objects in the Immigration Museum’s collection, which
is more recently acquired, it does suggest an administration and society that is more willing to
entertain the idea of systemic issues that have resulted in significant inequality.211 This is only
insofar as institutions concerning objects, not people. Macron has openly supported significantly
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more stringent laws concerning “Islamist separatism.”212 This rightward turn is arguably an
attempt to make himself palatable enough to the right in France that they will not vote for the
slew of far-right candidates who have launched presidential campaigns and gained significant
political ground over the last ten years.213 The idea of systemic issues is key when considering
how the Immigration Museum has approached racism and xenophobia, as well as identity
construction, regardless of the administration in power. The question of systemic racism and
xenophobia in France has been amplified by the recent global conversations about systemic
racism and the Black Lives Matter movement.214 This does not prevent the universalist French
approach from rejecting the need to discuss these elements as they pertain to identity and
immigration, but more so that there is a global conversation that France cannot fully remove
itself from.
In contrast to the earlier years’ disconnection from colonialism, the Immigration
Museum’s content over the past two years has not only responded to the global conversations
about race and racism, but has been responding to critiques of it ignoring its colonial past and not
serving the communities it purports to represent.215 Discussions about race, integration,
assimilation, and immigration have been featured in their Le Musée Part En Live series, as well
as additional online content, in part due to covid-19. The online discussions connect the content
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of the museum with more present concerns, including systemic racism, the Americanization of
French academia, and migration during the pandemic, using the site and current events as
interrogative contrasts.216 The closure and revamp of the permanent exhibition Repères,
commissioned by Benjamin Stora in 2017 and slated to open in the spring of 2023, intends to do
the same. 217 Historians Patrick Boucheron, Romain Bertrand, and director the museum
Sébastien Gokalp, have outlined their goals for moving the museum forward in multiple podcasts
available on the museum’s website.218 They hope to articulate the effects of colonialism and the
contemporary question of migration. The intention is to have a “history that speaks to the
present,” and to “speak to today with a historical project.”219 While Repères took a thematic
approach to the question of immigration, the renovated exhibition will address immigration
through a different lens.
The museum proposes a wide approach, from a chronological point of view (from 1685
to the present), geographic (France in the world), and thematic: regulations, migration,
demographics, the economy, every day life, culture, art, but also racism, discrimination,
the connection between slavery and colonialism.220
The exhibition will center on ten large dates, from 1685 to 2015, with a final section devoted to
contemporary questions.221 The goal of historians and the director who are overseeing this
change, is to recontextualize the immigration history of France through a post-colonial lens that
accounts for colonial memory, the process of migration, and present cultural, social, and political
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concerns.222 Arguably, while the critiques about the decontextualization of colonialism have
existed since the museum’s opening, the current political and social climate both globally and
more locally in France provide an opportune moment for the museum to make such an
intervention.
Up to this point the museum has not featured France’s colonial history or concerns about
integration and assimilation prominently or permanently. While the Immigration Museum has
discussed racism and xenophobia periodically in its exhibitions, often the narrative has neglected
their systemic nature and has focused on a universalist narrative that speaks to republican
assimilationism.223 That narrative ultimately supports the ways in which immigrants have
contributed, but simultaneously assimilated into France upon their arrival, and disconnects
migratory movement from greater structural and historic issues. In doing so, the museum has
continued the history of the site in ignoring or glorifying colonialism as a function of the French
state. This is in line with the previous two administrations’ rhetoric that ultimately called for a
universalist France, even if they took significantly different rhetorical approaches. Arguably the
museum’s current trajectory is in direct opposition to Macron’s turn to the political right, and
therefore his more vocal support for assimilation, laïcité, and anti-Muslim rhetoric.
The Immigration Museum is not the only institution at the site to undergo changes
indicative of recontextualizing the colonial past and the construction of national identity. Pap
Ndiaye, a historian of African American history and co-author of the report on racial diversity
for the Paris Opera, was appointed in 2021 as the new director of the Palais de la Porte Dorée.
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His experience and knowledge of African American history has made him a point person for
discussing and evaluating racial inclusivity, with multiple institutions utilizing his expertise.
These include the Musée d’Orsay and the Paris Opera.224 Under his direction the Palais de la
Porte Dorée and thus by extension the Musée National de l’Histoire de l’Immigration are slated
to confront the issues that are at the heart of the building, immigration and colonialism. Ndiaye’s
appointment suggests that the Palais de la Porte Dorée and the Immigration Museum are
intending not only to engage with current political and social concerns about race, identity,
immigration, and colonialism, but to knowingly place themselves in the historiographical
trajectory of these questions as an institution. As Ndiaye stated in an interview with the New
York Times, “‘This is an institution that is viewed as peripheral…’ ‘I would like it to be at the
center of French cultural life.’”225 His goal would disrupt the institution’s historical trajectory
since it transitioned from the Colonial Museum to the MAAO, effectively asking the public to
engage with the Palais de la Porte Dorée and the Immigration Museum as a cultural site
confronting the colonial past and the construction of identity.
Through the use of online content, the renovation of the permanent exhibition, and the
appointment of Pap Ndiaye, the museum and the Palais de la Porte Dorée are attempting to
address the long-standing critiques of the museum’s handling of the colonial past and its
connection to immigration narratives. By utilizing online discussion series and podcasts, the
museum has made the explicit transition from being a space devoted to an aesthetic, thematic
presentation of immigration to inserting itself into political conversations as an institutional
body. This also transitions from the periods of Sarkozy and Hollande, where political invocations
Farah Nayeri, “In a Palace of Colonialism, a ‘Quiet Revolutionary’ Takes Charge,” The New York Times, April 2, 2021.
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and interactions with the colonial past were predominately through temporary exhibitions. In this
case, the museum is engaging in longer term conversations and through non-exhibition spaces to
take part in political and cultural conversations that are at the forefront of current identity and
integration discussions.226 Whether this will translate into the permanent exhibition when it
reopens in the spring of 2023 remains to be seen, but the online content and renovation plans hint
at a promising approach that makes the museum more relevant, nuanced, and accurate in its
narration of the immigrant experience and contributions to France.
Can the Conundrum of French Identity and the Colonial Past be Solved?
The Musée National de l’Histoire de l’Immigration functions as a microcosm of the
unsettled relationship between French colonialism and the construction of French identity.
Beginning with the construction of the Palais de la Porte Dorée for the 1931 Exposition
Coloniale, as a representation of empire and coalescing colonial French identity, the building
through its various iterations has had to grapple with the explicit display of colonial power on its
façade. The Immigration Museum has had to contend with the question of the colonial past twofold, both because of its location and the connection between colonialism and the migratory
processes to France. The museum has been imbued with a colonial context since its inception,
both because of its location and the role of the memory debates of the 1990s in its creation. It’s
charge of promoting social cohesion has roots in the republican identity used to rationalize
colonialism and the creation of a France that was far larger than its European borders; an identity
that has remained a defining aspect of France long after the dissolution of empire. As such, the
goals of the museum are still predicated on a republican construction of national identity that
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cannot be disconnected from the colonial past. Thus, the museum’s recent attempts to address the
colonial past cannot be successful without addressing the state construction of identity.
The museum sits at the crux of debates about immigration, identity, integration, and the
concept of Frenchness. Use of the museum as a political touchstone, in positive and negative
terms, by different presidential administrations, showcase how the museum is an institutional
space and a public platform for exploring these debates. The museum’s identity and location
place it at the heart of these debates because it represents France’s difficulty in addressing its
colonial past. In addition, the museum represents formation of and access to French identity. The
Palais de la Porte Dorée’s construction as a colonial museum and subsequent thematic changes
only bolster the more explicit politicization of the museum by Sarkozy and Hollande. Sarkozy
intentionally ignoring the museum, while forming the Ministry of Immigration, Integration,
National Identity and Codevelopment, which stood in direct contrast to the museum’s goals,
showcases how the museum was read as a political entity. Hollande’s inaugural speech rhetoric
that focused on immigration, colonialism, and integration placed the museum in the public eye
once again, effectively calling for it to be used as a site for political, social, and cultural
rumination. The inauguration of the museum seven years after its opening speaks to the
museum’s location as a political entity within the French ethos, while simultaneously residing
peripherally, much like the people that it purports to represent. The appointment of Benjamin
Stora and the subsequent renovation of the permanent exhibition at his direction, highlight how
the museum is starting to address colonial memory. As a result, the museum has the opportunity
to engage with questions of systemic racism, rising Islamophobia, and colonial memory that are
salient and the topics du jour. With global and national conversations in France focusing on the
systemic nature of racism and colonialism, the museum’s transition towards a post-colonial
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approach is indicative of an attempt not only at relevancy, but nuance and accuracy. In addition,
it shows the museum is attempting to recontextualize its conundrum of the unsettled relationship
between the colonial past and the construction of identity, thereby addressing what it means to be
French historically and presently. The question is will France be able to do the same?
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